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1. Introduction
China’s so-called “first government procurement case” has taken seven years to adjudicate, even before
any substantive review of the allegations of the supplier’s bid challenge complaint. The saga of Modern
Wo’Er Trading Company Ltd v The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China raises compelling
questions about the relationship of China’s 1999 Tender and Bidding Law and China’s 2002 Government
Procurement Law, the nature of administrative power in China, and the ability of Chinese public
procurement law to offer justice to aggrieved suppliers.
Before proceeding to a description and analysis of the Modern Wo’Er case, however, some context is
needed. Section 2 below offers a short description of the origins of China’s 1999 Tender and Bidding Law
and China’s 2002 Government Procurement Law and how, from these two procurement laws, arise multiple
Chinese bid complaint mechanisms.

2. Context
2.1 A Short Tale of Two Laws
China’s 1999 Tender and Bidding Law was spearheaded by China’s National Development and Reform
Commission2 and other Chinese construction regulators. It represents China’s first national legislation
setting out mandatory procedures for awarding publicly financed (and even some privately financed)
1
No.1 Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, First Level Administrative Division Decision No.432 (2005) and No.1 Intermediate
Court of Beijing Municipality, First Level Administrative Division Decision No.433 (2005), both decided per judicial opinion dated December 8,
2006, sustained in High Court of Beijing Municipality, Final Administrative Decision No.245 (2007) and High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality,
Final Administrative Decision No.247 (2007) both appellate decisions decided per judicial opinions dated November 21, 2012. The two cases, stemming
from the same primary procurement project, are nearly identical in facts, argument and judicial analysis, so are treated as a single case for purposes
of the Note. The use of Leviathan in the title of this Note is borrowed from Thomas Hobb’s 1651 classic of political philosophy of the same name,
used to refer to a “Commonwealth” or “State.”
2
Formerly the National Development and Planning Commission, the key regulator of China’s planned economy.
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construction projects. The drafters of the tender and bidding law were focused primarily on controlling
construction quality and preventing corruption in the construction contract award/performance process.
The law became part of China’s 9th Five-Year Legislative Plan (1995–2000), promulgated in August
1999, effective January 1, 2000.
Belatedly China’s Ministry of Finance realised that the Tender and Bidding Law was also in nature a
public procurement law, with real implications for the public budget and best value procurements.
Since the tender and bidding law was, accordingly to plan, issued in 1999, all the Ministry of Finance
could do was get the drafting of a “government procurement” law into China’s 10th Five-Year Legislative
Plan. That later plan should have focused on expanding the original tender and bidding law into a
full-fledged public procurement law. Unfortunately that is not how things proceeded, and a government
procurement law was issued separately. For over a decade now, China has been saddled with two public
procurement regimes (a tender and bidding system and government procurement system) co-existing
uneasily.
The drafting process for the 1999 Tender in Bidding Law was itself a contest for regulatory control
over tendering and bidding concerning a host of construction activities, a contest that still plays out in one
form or another (see section 2.2 below). This turf battle expanded as the Ministry of Finance sought sole
supervisory role over all purchases by the Chinese government, pursuant to the drafting process of China’s
2002 Government Procurement Law.
Amazingly, supplier representatives were completely absent in the drafting process for China’s 2002
Government Procurement Law. Instead, the battling constituents were mainly government departments,
with a lone representative of a state-owned commercial procurement intermediary.3 Led by a legislative
drafting team from China National People’s Congress (the Chinese legislature), Finance and Economic
Law Committee, and heavily influenced by representatives from China’s Ministry of Finance, the process
was aided by Chinese academics and foreign experts.
During the drafting process of the 2002 Government Procurement Law, NDRC’s efforts to keep
construction outside the definition of the government procurement, and thus outside the supervision of
China’s Ministry of Finance, were far from subtle.4 Fortunately, arguments that the international definition
of government procurement includes the purchase of goods, construction and services won the day.5 That
victory was ultimately compromised, however, with the addition of art.4 of the 2002 Government
Procurement Law which states that “[w]here government procurement of construction takes the form of
public bidding, then the tender and bidding law should be used”.6 Thus the question of which law
substantively applied to the government procurement of construction, and which agency was the supreme
regulator of public construction, were deferred to a later day.7 Indirectly, these issues are now being played
out in the Modern Wo’Er litigation.

2.2 China’s Multiple Bid Challenge Mechanisms
Among the innovations of China’s 2002 Government Procurement Law are the designation of China’s
Ministry of Finance and local finance departments as chief policy-makers and supervisors for the Chinese
government procurement system, and the strict separation of procurement oversight functions from the
3
Article 12 of the 1999 Tender and Bidding Law and art.18 of the 2002 Government Procurement contemplate public purchasers entrusting
commercial bidding intermediaries for implementation of procurement competitions.
4
Equally forthright was the representative of the Chinese military, who confidently, articulately and successfully spelled out how military purchases
should be exempt from coverage of the then pending government procurement law. The result is art.86 of the law which states that “laws and regulations
for military procurement shall be separately formulated by the Central Military Commission.”
5
2002 Government Procurement Law, art.2 defining government procurement as the purchase of goods, construction and services.
6
2002 Government Procurement Law, art.4.
7
For an exploration into the implications of art.4 of the 2002 Government Procurement Law see Wang, Ping and Xinglin Zhang, Chinese Public
Procurement Law: An Introductory Textbook pp. 88–90 available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/publications/short-textbooks.aspx [Accessed
March 20, 2013].
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purchasing functions of other government departments.8 Equally important is the Government Procurement
Law’s establishment of procedures for disappointed suppliers to file complaints asserting
improprieties/illegalities in the procurement process. The law sets out three stages for the processing of
such complaints: (1) The complaining supplier must first file a query with the purchaser, or the purchaser’s
bidding agent, inquiring about problems in the procurement process.9 If the supplier is unsatisfied by the
response of the purchaser, it can then proceed to (2) file a complaint with the finance department at the
same level of government as the relevant purchase.10 Under the law, the relevant finance department has
thirty days in which to respond to a supplier’s complaint.11 If the supplier is not satisfied with the response
of the finance department, it can then proceed to (3) file actions under China’s administrative legal system,
namely seeking administration reconsideration at the next level of Chinese government and/or filing
administrative litigation in the Chinese Courts.12
In contrast, China’s 1999 Tender and Bidding Law remains silent as to chief regulator. Moreover, it
simply offers the right to complain, but no complaint procedures.13 These deficiencies were later corrected
in part by the State Council Opinion on the Division of Responsibilities for Administrative Supervision
Among the Relevant Administrative Departments Carrying Out Tender and Bidding Activities (Office of
State Council Document No.34, 2000) (hereinafter referred to as the State Council 2000 Opinion). The
State Council 2000 Opinion distributes supervisory powers over tender and bidding activities loosely
among eight different agencies depending on the nature of the relevant construction activity involved.
Consequently, China’s National Development and Reform Commission was granted general policy
leadership over tender and bidding and specific supervision over “national large-scale construction projects,”
China’s Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction (formerly China’s Ministry of Construction)
was allocated oversight of tender and bidding for general construction, China’s Ministry of Transportation
was granted regulatory power over tender and bidding of highway construction, China’s Ministry of Water
Resources was granted regulatory authority over tender and bidding for waterworks projects, China’s
Ministry of Railways granted authority over tender and bidding for railway construction, etc. More recently,
China’s State Council issued Implementing Regulations for the Tender and Bidding Law of the People’s
Republic of China (State Council Order No.613, 2012) which largely restate, indeed compound, the
ill-defined regulatory roles first articulated the State Council 2000 Opinion.14
Under the State Council 2000 Opinion, Chinese departments tasked with supervision of tender and
bidding activities were also instructed to accept and handle complaints by bidders and other interested
parties according to the division of work contemplated by the Opinion.15 It was not until June 2004,
however, that China had any national-level complaint rules for supplier bid challenges related to the tender
and bidding system, when the forerunner of the NDRC and seven other construction regulators passed
8
2002 Government Procurement Law, articles 13 and 60. Remarkably, ten years from the passage of the law, the separation of supervisory functions
from purchasing functions still remains a challenge. The Henan Provincial Finance Department recently admonished local finance departments to
implement the separation and refrain from “having two signs, but one set of personnel” for government procurement. Guiding Opinions of the Henan
Province Department of Finance Regarding Progressing and Strengthening Government Procurement Work, Henan Finance Department, Office of
Government Procurement Document No.19 (2012) at para.3 available at http://www.hngp.gov.cn/gongyi/zcfg/sjfgzd/webinfo/2012/12/1356309589686291
.htm [Accessed 13 March, 2013].
9
2002 Government Procurement Law, articles 51 and 54.
10
See above at art.55.
11
See above at art.56
12
See generally, 1989 Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China and 2000 Administrative Reconsideration Law of the
People’s Republic of China.
13
1999 Tender and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China, art.65 (creating a basic “right to raise objections to the bid inviter or file a
complaint with [a then unknown] relevant department of administrative supervision”).
14
Implementing Regulations for the Tender and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Order No.613 (issued December 20,
2011, effective February 1, 2012) at art.4. Available in English, with subscription, at http://www.lawinfochina.com [Accessed March 13, 2013].
Interestingly, art.4 of the Implementing Regulations for the Tender and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China adds an oversight role for
supervisory departments, (China’s administrative supervisor and counter-corruption agency). It also surprisingly includes a general monitoring role
for China’s finance departments, in the area of “budgetary performance and the implementation of government procurement policies on government
procurement projects that are subject to bidding.”
15
State Council 2000 Opinion, para.3.
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rules governing bid protests, allowing these Chinese departments to separately set up their own bid
complaints system.16 Almost two months later, seemingly tit-for-tat, China’s Ministry of Finance established
rules for implementing the bid challenge procedures of the 2002 Government Procurement Law.17
Unsurprisingly, the dissected governance model for Chinese public procurement spawned a number
of bid protest mechanisms among a diversity of government departments, at all levels of government
throughout China.18 In Modern Wo’Er, the hapless supplier is snared in a grey area between two such
mechanisms.

3. Background on the Modern Wo’Er Case
In October 2004, Modern Wo’Er Trading Company bid to sell the Chinese Government blood gas analysing
equipment. This medical equipment procurement contract was a very small part of a very large three-year
project to construct a “Public Health Rescue and Medical Treatment System” throughout China.19 In charge
of this project, and thus serving as the relevant procuring agencies, were NDRC and China’s Ministry of
Health.
Modern Wo’Er’s bid was unsuccessful, despite offering the lowest price of all participating bidders.
Confused about why it had lost the competition, and why the award went to the highest priced bidder,
Modern Wo’Er filed an inquiry with the NDRC and MOH. Through a procurement intermediary, these
purchasers’ provided a response to Modern Wo’Er query, the contents of which consisted of irrelevancies
and equivocation. Unsatisfied, and undeterred, Modern Wo’Er then filed a complaint with China’s Ministry
of Finance alleging a number of irregularities in the procurement process.
According to China’s 2003 Government Procurement Law, the Ministry of Finance is required to
provide a response to a supplier’s complaint within thirty working days of receipt of such a complaint.20
Modern Wo’Er submitted its complaint to China’s Ministry of Finance on December 21, 2004. Seven
years on, however, investigation of these alleged procurement irregularities has not even commenced. In
the interim, what has transpired, or indeed not transpired, is disheartening.
Failure of the Ministry of Finance to rule on its procurement complaint forced Modern Wo’Er to seek
relief from the Chinese judiciary. Unfortunately, this did not mean the opportunity to submit its full
substantive bid protest to a Chinese court. To the contrary, “in [Chinese] administrative litigation, the
competent court examines only whether the administrative review body properly handles the supplier’s
complaint against the procuring entity or whether the administrative reconsideration organ properly deals
with the supplier’s complaint against the administrative review body’s decision; it has no power to deal
with the original dispute between the supplier and the procuring entity”.21 In Modern Wo’Er, the allegations
of procurement law violations are even further removed, with the Courts focusing solely on whether the
16
Measures for Handling Complaints Concerning Tender and Bidding for Engineering Construction Projects, (National Development and Planning
Commission, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Information Industries, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Water
Resources and China Civil Aviation Administration Order No.11 issued June 21, 2004, effective August 1, 2004). Available in English, with subscription
at http://www.lawchinainfo.com [Accessed March 4, 2013]. These Measures were supplemented by the recent Implementing Regulations for the Tender
and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China (Chapter 5, articles 61–62).
17
Measures for Handling Complaints of Government Procurement Suppliers, (Ministry of Finance Order No. 20 issued August 11, 2004, effective
September 11, 2004). Available in English, with a subscription, at http://www.lawchinainfo.com [Accessed March 4, 2013].
18
Research on local bid challenge administration will reveal a host of such regimes. See e.g. Dalian Xinsheng Fire Engineering Company Co v
Dalian M&E Engineering Equipment Company , Shenyang Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Civil Division No.3, First Instance Decision No.7
(2005) (dealing with, among other things, a municipal bid protest mechanism under the local aviation regulator) and Television Broadcasting Bureau
of Huaihua Municipality v Construction Bureau of Huaihua Municipality , Intermediate Court of Huaihua Municipality, Hunan Province, Administrative
Division First Level Decision No.7 (2004) (assessing a bid complaints process statutorily imposed on a local construction department, against bid
complaints handling by a local communist party counter-corruption organisation). An analysis of Television Broadcasting is provided below in section
4 of this note.
19
“Notice of the State Council Turning Over Planning and Construction of a Public Health Rescue and Medical Treatment System to National
Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Health, Office of State Council Document No.82 (2003). The project followed the SARs
outbreak in China, a crisis which laid bare shortcomings in China’s then health emergency response systems.
20
2002 Government Procurement Law, art.56.
21
Wang, Ping and Xinglin Zhang, fn.7 above, p.135.
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Ministry of Finance acted properly in not answering the complaint. Moreover, the nature of the available
lawsuit—a claim of administrative nonfeasance against a government department—offers very limited
relief.22 When Chinese agencies neglect or refuse to carry out administrative responsibilities, such as the
responsibility to rule on complaints, Chinese courts can only order the relevant agency to carry out the
required administrative act, no matter how derelict the government department, and maybe assess monetary
penalties against the agency.23
The Ministry of Finance’s sole defence in Modern Wo’Er is that Wo’Er improperly filed its complaint
with the Ministry. As support for its position, the Ministry contends that the proper handling of the
complaint rested with the NDRC, noting that the NDRC had primary supervisory role for tender and
bidding on “national large-scale construction projects” by virtue of the division of responsibilities over
tender and bidding activities as directed by China’s State Council 2000 Opinion.24 The “emergency health
response” project, insisted the Ministry, constituted just such a “national large-scale construction project,”
coming within the regulatory province of the NDRC. Indeed, soon after receiving the Modern Wo’Er’s
complaint, the Ministry of Finance referred the matter (the written complaint and relevant documentation)
to the appropriate office at the NDRC. Consequently, argued the Ministry, it had already properly carried
out its administrative responsibility.
The trial court rejected the Ministry of Finance’s explanation. Never addressing the issue of whether
the relevant project was a “national large-scale construction project” subject to the supervision of the
NDRC, the lower court focused instead on the definition of “government procurement” under Chinese
law.25 Drawing upon the language of China’s 2003 Government Procurement Law, the lower court
reaffirmed that “government procurement” is the “purchase of goods, construction and services using
fiscal funds.” In turn, the Court found that the specific contract at issue as the purchase of goods; hence
government procurement. Finding further that the Ministry of Finance was the designated supervisory
department for government procurement under the law, and thus tasked with handling complaints derived
from the procurement process, the trial court ruled that it was the administrative responsibility of the
Ministry of Finance to handle Modern Wo’Er’s complaint.26 Accordingly, in a judicial opinion dated
December 8, 2006, the trial court ordered the Ministry of Finance to do so.27
Soon afterwards, on December 22, 2006, the Ministry of Finance appealed the trial court’s opinion. A
hearing on that appeal was held on June 7, 2007.28 Inexplicably, the appellate opinion did not issue for
over five years until November 21, 2012, despite their being no factual disputes in the case, only issues
of law.
Although the appellate court ultimately sustained the trial court’s opinion, it failed to expressly reaffirm
the lower court analysis that the contract at issue were a goods purchase using fiscal funds and, as such,
were “government procurement” as defined by law (thus triggering the Ministry of Finance’s duty to rule
on the complaints as the designated supervisory agency under China’s 2002 Government Procurement
Law). Rather, the higher court simply faulted the Ministry of Finance for failing to notify Modern Wo’Er
22

1989 Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China, art.(11)(5).
XinMi Construction Bureau v XinMi ShaungFu Construction Co , High Peoples Court of Henan Province, Final Administrative Decision No.15
(2000) where the appellate court criticised the lower court for ruling on the substance of a bid protest originally ignored by a local construction
department, instead returning the complaint to that department and ordering that department to pay ¥ 200 per day until a ruling was issued (on file with
author). No such accruing penalty was imposed on the Ministry of Finance in Modern Wo’Er, thus aiding the Ministry’s reluctance to act on the
complaint.
24
Citing the State Council 2000 Opinion and the “Temporary Measures for Supervision of Tendering and Bidding on National Large-Scale
Construction Projects”, NDRC Document No.18 (January 10, 2002).
25
Daniel Mitterhoff Beijing Court Orders Ministry of Finance to Rule on Supplier’s Complaints, But Skirts Broader Issue of Schism in China’s
Procurement Supervision (West Thompson, 2006) 3 International Government Contractor, para.98 available at http://works.bepress.com/daniel
_mitterhoff/2/ [Accessed March 13, 2013].
26
See above.
27
See fn.1 above.
28
Xu Hao, The Ministry of Finance Loses “The First Government Procurement Case”, China Management Report (November 24, 2012) available
at http://www.cb.com.cn/1634427/20121124/428857.html [Accessed March 4, 2013] (interviewing Modern Wo’Er’s counsel, Mr GU Liaohai).
23

(2013) 22 P.P.L.R., Issue 3 © 2013 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors

NA52

Public Procurement Law Review

in writing that it had referred the matter to the relevant office at the NDRC, finding this one omission as
the relevant administrative nonfeasance. On this sole finding, the appellate court sustained the lower
court’s opinion. Troublingly, the appellate opinion does not expressly re-order the Ministry of Finance to
rule on Modern Wo’Er’s complaint (although one hopes by sustaining the lower court ruling, a Ministry
decision on the complaint should be the next step in the process). The appellate Court also ordered the
Ministry to pay a measly ¥50 (approximately $7.50) in court costs. At the time of this writing, the Ministry
of Finance has yet to provide a written response to Modern Wo’Er’s complaint.

4. Not An Isolated Incident
The supplier’s dilemma showcased in Modern Wo’Er is not an outlier. Frighteningly, it may be common.
Other case adjudications reflect injustices resulting from ill-defined regulatory boundaries in Chinese
procurement governance.29 And project owners are not immune, as demonstrated by the case of Television
Broadcasting Bureau of Huaihua Municipality v Construction Bureau of Huaihua Muncipality.30
Television Broadcasting involved the construction of a public broadcasting facility by a local public
broadcaster.31 The primary supervisory department responsible for this procurement was the local
construction bureau. Local rules governing the project provided specific bid challenge procedures as
follows. First, within 15 days of a bidding process the bidding results should be reported by the project
owner or by the owner’s tender agent to the local construction bureau. After such filing, bidders then have
five days to submit complaints alleging any illegalities in the process. If no complaints are raised within
the five days, then the project owner is authorised to make formal contract award, allowing the project to
proceed.32 If a complaint is timely filed, then the construction department has thirty days to dispose of the
complaint, making a decision as to whether the project may proceed with the contract as awarded or
corrective action needs to be taken by the project owner.33
Three bidders submitted offers to build the broadcasting facility. Upon award, one unsuccessful bidder
promptly filed a complaint, but not with the relevant construction bureau as per the above-referenced
procedures. Instead, the aggrieved bidder filed its complaint with the local Chinese Communist Party
Discipline Inspection Committee (hereinafter referred to as DIC).34 Following the rule-based procedures,
the project owner’s tendering agent proceeded to file the bid results with the local construction department.
However, the statutory filing was rejected on repeated occasions.35 The claimed basis for rejecting the
filing was that a bidder on the project had complained to the DIC.
The DIC, in turn, spent months trying to mediate the dispute (there were about four mediations over
five months), and even recruited the local construction bureau to help with the investigation and resolution.36
However, during this time, the dismayed project owner was unable to get any guidance from the construction
bureau (the supposed primary supervisor) on how to proceed. The project was placed in limbo. Frustrated,
and obviously suffering delay damages, the project owner sued the construction bureau seeking
compensation for harm arising from the latter’s failure to carry out its legal duty to handle the complaint
and make a decision within the required 30 days.
29
Daniel Mitterhoff Grappling with the Regulatory Environment For Chinese Public Procurement, 3 International Government Contractor para.17
discussing the case of Hebei Yanzhao Eng’g and Construction Management Company v The National Development and Reform Commission of Hebei
Province , Intermediate People’s Court of Shijiazhuang Municipality, First Level Administrative Division Decision, No.11 (2005) available at http:/
/works.bepress.com/daniel_mitterhoff/5/ [Accessed March 20, 2013]. In Hebei Yanzhao, the Court upheld an administrative penalty of dubious legality
against a commercial bidding intermediary. Relying on its compliance with the procurement opportunity advertising rules of the local municipal
construction regulator, the intermediary was blind-sided by a fine assessed by the provincial office of the NDRC.
30
Intermediate Court of Huaihua Municipality, Hunan Province, Administrative Division First Level Decision No.7 (2004) (on file with author).
31
See above.
32
See above.
33
See above.
34
See above. at p.7.
35
See above. at p.8
36
See above.
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The Court rejected the project owner’s claim, finding that since the construction bureau did not actually
receive a formal complaint from the aggrieved bidder, it did not have the administrative duty to act on the
complaint.37 Yet the Court simultaneously found that the construction bureau, “as the supervisory department
for tendering and bidding activities” was correct in staying the procurement procedure when it learned
that a complaint was pending with the DIC.38 It also found that the DIC’s recruitment of the local
construction bureau to assist was just that—a request for assistance—and not removal/referral of the
complaint from the DIC to the construction department.39
The entire process, from original bid award to the construction bureau finally making a justiciable
decision, and then administrative appeals to that decision, forced the project owner to wait almost a year
before reinstituting the bidding, the Court seemingly ignorant as to the Kafkaesque plight of the owner
stemming from the poorly defined regulatory roles of relevant government agents. Logic would indicate
that if the Court acknowledged the local construction bureau “as the supervisory department for tender
and bidding activities,” that it, not the DIC, should be primarily responsible for the complaint, with the
local bid protest procedures controlling, thus requiring a ruling on the Complaint in 30 days. The Court’s
attempt to reconcile the concurrent complaint processes, as grounds to avoid government liability, was
not only illogical, but unwise for the health of the overall system. Preferably, the Court should have
affirmed the primacy of the more detailed bid protest rules, highlighted the failure of the local construction
department to comply with such rules, and awarded damages to the plaintiff, sending the message that
such administrative inefficiencies as manifested in the case would not be tolerated. Fortunately, the
administratively induced delay suffered by the Plaintiff in Television Broadcasting lasted only a year, not
the seven years delay and still going being suffered by Modern Wo’Er.

5. Analysis
5.1 China’s Unresponsive Bid Challenge Systems: Is There A Legal Solution?
Bid challenge systems provide an important vehicle for holding government actors accountability for
compliance with procurement rules and procurement outcomes.40 When governments violate procurement
norms, bid challenge systems also offer proper relief to aggrieved bidders.41 Failure of their proper and
intended operation actually undermines otherwise well written procurement law, as an unresponsive
challenge system only encourages suppliers to opt out of the public procurement system, sapping it of the
competition needed for the government to get best value for budgetary outlays. If suppliers feel cheated
by the actual purchase process, only to later languish in an unresponsive bid challenge process, they will
simple quit competing for contracts. Thus while Modern Wo’Er represents a tragicomedy for the immediate
supplier, and an embarrassment to the Chinese government, its harm to the broader Chinese public
procurement system should not be underestimated. The overall system’s indifference to the impact of
such a long-awaited non-decision on supplier trust in China’s public procurement system bodes ill for the
healthy development of China’s public procurement regime.
A big question, one unanswerable in the limited confines of this Note, surrounds how to reign in
rent-seeking administrative agents, who covet the administrative province of other agencies, but jealously
guard their own. A good start might be for China’s State Council to stop serving as an enabler, and abandon
the practice of statutorily devising ill-defined and overlapping regulatory roles for those agencies claiming
37

See above. at p.9.
See above. at pp.8–9. The project owner also argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the local DIC, as an instrumentality of the Chinese Communist
Party, was not a government department with the status to hear complaints. See above. at pp.3 and 9.
39
See above.
40
Daniel Gordon Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The Choices That Every Procurement Challenge System Must Make, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 427,
430 (2006).
41
See above.
38
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supervisory powers over public purchasing, construction or otherwise. Such a change of practice, however,
might be of limited effect, given the wide-ranging authority exercised by Chinese executive departments
as compared to other political actors in China, even the State Council itself. Watching the Chinese Ministry
of Finance struggle for regulatory supremacy over government procurement in the drafting process of the
2002 Government Procurement Law, yet later balk when it comes to properly exercising this administrative
responsibility in the face of Modern Wo’Er’s bid complaints, has been at once fascinating and dispiriting.
Yet closer observers might well sympathise with the Ministry as it is clear it bears some reasonable fear
of scrutinizing a purchase managed by the more powerful NDRC. (The NDRC is sometimes disparagingly
referred to as the “Little State Council” by non-NDRC government officials). The Beijing Courts,
particularly the Beijing High Court, seem to share this fear, as evidenced by its years of delay in handling
an appeal of a relatively simple legal dispute. If and when the Ministry of Finance provides notice to the
supplier in writing stating that it had referred the matter to the NDRC for consideration, then what? Will
the NDRC rule on the complaint (which, via the earlier referral, it could have done all along)? Will Modern
Wo’Er, already dejected by seven years delayed justice, be forced to re-start the process elsewhere? Will
it even bother?

5.2 Resolving Conflicts of Law Chinese Style
Viewed narrowly, Modern Wo’Er is a simple legal dispute over which administrative supervisory department
in China is legally responsible for handling a supplier’s complaint on a particular public project. That
determination in turn depends first on determining which law applies to the case, the 1999 Tender and
Bidding Law or the 2002 Government Procurement Law. Unfortunately, Chinese courts are poorly situated
to resolve such conflict of law issues.

5.2.1 Limited Power of Chinese Courts
A general principle is that Chinese courts only possess the power to apply, not interpret or review Chinese
legislation.42 Explicitly resolving a conflict of laws question can actually land a judge in deep trouble.43
In practice, however, Chinese judges regularly, indirectly and with luck discreetly resolve conflict of laws
problems by simply choosing to apply one law over another, simply ignoring the latter.44 Quite neatly,
this is exactly what the trial court did in Modern Wo’Er, finding that the purchase at issue in Modern
Wo’Er was a goods procurement triggering application of the 2002 Government Procurement Law.
Preferably, the trial court should have been more courageous, simultaneously explaining why the project
at issue was not a “national large-scale construction project,” (a finding which also falls safely in the realm
of applying law to facts and not resolving broader tensions between China’s two procurement laws).
Considering the limited function of Chinese courts, however, the trial court’s original interpretative
boldness should be applauded.
The appellate court, in contrast, retreated from the issues of legislative/systemic conflict and, failing
the interest of greater clarity, narrowly characterised the Ministry of Finance’s administrative malfeasance
as a failure to notify Modern Wo’Er in writing that its complaint and supporting documentation had been
referred to the NDRC. As a result, the Modern Wo’Er litigation now barely resembles a case of public
procurement law.

42
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5.2.2 Other Legal Principles Available to the Court
The Courts in Modern Wo’Er had other avenues to explore to resolve the issue of which agency was
responsible to handle the relevant procurement complaint. As a general rule, when there are inconsistencies
between laws, special provisions apply over general provisions and new provisions prevail over old
provisions.45 Arguably then, the provisions of the later 2002 Government Procurement Law should take
precedence over the earlier 1999 Tender and Bidding Law, dispensing with the acrobatics of determining
whether the project at issue was a “goods procurement” or a “national large- scale infrastructure project.”
However, application of this principle gets tripped up by art. 4 of the 2002 Government Procurement Law
which contemporises both laws by instructing that with respect to bid competitions for government
procurement of construction, the tender and bidding law should apply. The “newer law beats older law”
principal has greater traction when considering art.60 of the 2002 Government Procurement Law, which
prohibits a supervisor of government procurement from engaging in purchasing activities. The Beijing
Courts could have instructed the Ministry of Finance to rule on Modern Wo’Er’s complaint on the
fundamental principal that the purchaser (the NDRC) cannot act as supervisor of its own procurement
activities. Such a ruling would better strike at the core problem, derived from Chinese agencies wanting
broad regulatory portfolios over which they self-supervise and avoid external policing.46

5.2.3 Conflict Resolution By Other Political Actors
The Modern Wo’Er courts might also have been wiser to flip the conflicts of law dilemma back into
China’s legislative system, as the power to interpret law and resolve conflicts between and among laws
rests with the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress.47 The Beijing Courts were free
to refer the matter to the Supreme People’s Court who in turn could have referred the matter for resolution
by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.48 Then again, if they were interested, the
National People’s Congress and/or its Standing Committee have the power to simply promulgate a new
single public procurement law (hopefully above the fray of jostling administrative agents) finally merging
the tender and bidding system with the government procurement system, so their responsiveness to a
case-specific referral is in doubt. Moreover, evidence suggests that the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress rarely employs its interpretive powers.49
The State Council is also well-situated to resolve the conflicts issue actualized by Modern Wo’Er.
While on a broader level, the case juxtaposes the 2002 Government Procurement Law and the 1999 Tender
and Bidding Law, it more specifically pits the NDRC’s Measures for Handling Complaints Concerning
Tender and Bidding for Engineering Construction Projects50 against the Ministry of Finance’s Measures
for Handling Complaints of Government Procurement Suppliers,51 two departmental rules. The State
Council is expressly authorised to resolve conflicts between rules emanating from different administrative
departments.52 Indeed the State Council, as progenitor of the concept of “large scale infrastructure projects,”
supervision of which it entrusted to the NDRC,53 is best poised to define this concept in the context of the
Modern Wo’Er dispute. (Interestingly, Modern Wo’Er’s counsel attributes the Ministry of Finance loss
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to the Ministry’s failure to provide evidence to support its allegation that the project should be classed as
a “national large-scale infrastructure” project).54 Unfortunately, like the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress power to resolve conflicts of legislation, the State Council sparingly employs its power
to resolve conflicts of department rules.55 And anyway, the machinations in Modern Wo’Er originate from
the State Council’s countenance of ill-defined supervisory roles over public procurement, dynamics that
the State Council seems ready to perpetuate rather than solve.56

6. Conclusion
Instead of law serving to rationally order China’s public procurement administration, a perverted
combination of rent-seeking and responsibility avoidance by Chinese government departments serves to
create chaos in the application of Chinese public procurement law. On paper, Chinese public procurement
law contains the necessary provisions to enliven China’s bid challenge system for the purposes of properly
airing, and resolving, grievances of disappointed suppliers. Moreover, against the timidity of and limitations
imposed upon Chinese courts, China’s Law on Legislation textually provides other mechanisms (legislative
and administrative) for resolving systematic conflicts between China’s uniquely bifurcated “tender and
bidding” and “government procurement” regime. What is lacking is the political will at higher echelons
of Chinese government to exercise powers to properly order public procurement management and constrain
the turf battles and power plays among Chinese government departments that ultimately undermine
functional procurement law. It is not just Modern Wo’Er, but all players in China’s public procurement
system, that wait for deliverance from the Chinese state.
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